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CAVEAT LENDER-FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW DOES NOT
APPLY TO A COMMERCIAL LOAN SECURED BY A
PLEDGE OF SECURITIES
Lincoln National Bank v. Herber
604 F.2d 1039 (7th Cir. 1979)
Prior to the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Lincoln National Bank v. Herber,I three federal cir-
cuit courts had considered whether a pledge of securities as collateral
for a loan constitutes a "sale" of securities within the meaning of the
Securities Act of 19332 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 3 The
Second and Sixth Circuits4 determined that such a pledge constituted a
"sale" of securities, 5 while the Fifth Circuit reached the opposite con-
clusion regarding this issue.6 In a well-reasoned opinion by Senior Cir-
cuit Judge Castle, the Seventh Circuit in Herber adopted a "context
over form" approach which had been formulated by the United States
Supreme Court in defining a. "security" under the federal securities
acts. 7 In utilizing this approach, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a
pledge of securities does not constitute a "sale" of securities under the
antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
This case comment will initially consider the legislative history of
the federal securities acts and the United States Supreme Court's appli-
cation of that legislative history in prior decisions which are relevant to
Herber. The facts and holdings of the prior appellate cases which in-
volved the issue decided in Herber will be examined. The facts and
lower court history of the case and the rationale of the Herber court
1. 604 F.2d 1039 (7th Cir. 1979).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the 1933 Act].
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the 1934 Act].
4. See Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979); Mallis v. FDIC,
568 F.2d 824 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 431 U.S. 928 (1977), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,
435 U.S. 381 (1978); United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936
(1976).
5. Section 77b(3) of the 1933 Act states: "The terms 'sale' or 'sell' shall include every con-
tract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3)
(1976). Section 78c(a)(14) of the 1934 Act states: "The terms 'sale' and 'sell' each include any
contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." Id. § 78c(a)(14). Unlike the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act also
defines the terms "buy" and "purchase" as follows: "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include
any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." Id. § 78c(a)(13).
6. See National Bank of Commerce v. All Am. Assur. Co., 583 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1978).
7. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
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will be reviewed. Finally, the Herber decision will be analyzed and it
will be demonstrated that the Seventh Circuit's decision rests upon
sound reasoning and policy considerations.
THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACTS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Congressional activity in the area of securities regulation resulted
primarily from the stock market crash of October 1929.8 Congressional
concern about the state of the securities industry in the late 1920's and
early 1930's is reflected in the articulated purposes of the two acts. The
Securities Act of 1933 was enacted "to provide full and fair disclosure
of the character of securities . . and to prevent frauds in the sale of
securities."9 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was designed "to
provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and over-the-counter
markets . . . and to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such
exchanges and markets."10 In essence, both acts were designed to elim-
inate the abuses which had existed in the financial markets and which
had contributed to the stock market crash." To oversee the adminis-
tration and enforcement of the federal securities acts, section 4 of the
1934 Act 12 created the Securities and Exchange Commission.13
The underlying purpose of the securities legislation is reflected in
the statement of Senator Fletcher, the sponsor of the 1933 Act. Senator
Fletcher explained that "the purpose of [the 1933 Act] is to protect the
investing public and honest business."' 14 The goal of the 1933 Act was
"to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound,
fraudulent, and worthless securities; to place adequate and true infor-
mation before the investor."' 5 Senator Fletcher indicated that the aims
of the 1933 Act may be attained "upon the basis of fidelity to truth."'16
8. I L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 119-21 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss];
Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 30 (1959).
9. Preamble to the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
10. Preamble to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
II. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975). See generalo James, The
Securities Act of 1933, 32 MICH. L. REV. 624, 624-30 (1934); Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214, 216-17 (1959).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1976).
13. Hereinafter referred to as the SEC. The 1934 amendments to the 1933 Act transferred
the functions originally delegated to the Federal Trade Commission to the newly-created SEC. 15
U.S.C. § 78i (1976).
14. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
15. Id.
16. Id. For a comprehensive history of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, see J. ELLENBERGER & E.
MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES Ex-
CHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973).
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Professor Loss, a noted commentator in the area of securities regula-
tion, stated that the primary purposes of the 1934 Act are four-fold: (1)
to provide disclosure to purchasers and sellers of securities; (2) to regu-
late the securities exchanges and markets; (3) to control the amount of
credit in these exchanges and markets; and (4) to present and provide
remedies for fraudulent securities transactions and market manipula-
tion.17 In short, Congress sought to protect the investing public and its
interests in the securities market.' 8
In interpreting federal securities law, the United States Supreme
Court has favored a flexible approach in order to promote better the
underlying investor-oriented purposes of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 19 At
no time has the Court adopted a literal approach to the construction of
the two acts.20 Although the initial focus in construing federal securi-
ties law is naturally on the language of the statute itself,21 the Court has
cautioned that "a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet
not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the inten-
tion of its makers. '" 22
The Supreme Court's desire to interpret the federal securities acts
in accordance with congressional intent is reflected in the Court's rec-
ognition of private enforcement of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 23 and
rule lOb-5, 24 despite the lack of an express statutory command author-
izing such actions.25 Accordingly, the Court has limited an implied pri-
vate right of action to situations where the private cause of action is
necessary to fulfill congressional goals.26
The interpretation of federal securities law also depends upon the
economic realities of security transactions; such transactions, after all,
17. Loss, supra note 8, at 130-3 1.
18. See, e.g., United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975).
19. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
20. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
21. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
22. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975), quoting Church of the
Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) [hereinafter referred to in text and footnotes as section 10(b)].
24. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1979) [hereinafter referred to in text and footnotes as rule lob-5].
25. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
26. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). In defining the situations in which an
implied private right of action exists, the United States Supreme Court has adopted a four-part
test applicable to the federal securities acts. The first inquiry is "whether the plaintiff is 'one of the
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted... ' " Second, it must be ascertained
whether there is " 'any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to create such a remedy
or deny one.' " The third consideration is "whether it is 'consistent with the underlying scheme to
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff.'" Finally, it must be determined "'whether the cause of
action [is] traditionally relegated to state law .. ' " Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. I, 37-
40 (1977), quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (emphasis in original).
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are economic in nature.27 The Supreme Court has identified a basic
test for distinguishing a securities transaction from other types of com-
mercial transactions. A securities transaction "involves an investment
of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the
efforts of others. ' 28 In entering into a securities transaction, the inves-
tor hopes to obtain economic benefits through the form of profits. 29
Since the 1933 and 1934 Acts are remedial in nature, the Supreme
Court has sought to interpret the acts as broadly as the statutory lan-
guage permits in order to carry out the expressed legislative intent.30
The Supreme Court has chosen to concentrate on the substance of a
securities transaction, rather than its form.3' The basis for this "sub-
stance over form" approach is found in the caveat "unless the context
otherwise requires" 32 which precedes the definitional sections of the
1933 and 1934 Acts.33 In applying federal securities law to a particular
transaction, the Court has stated "form should be disregarded for sub-
stance and the emphasis should be on economic reality. '34 Thus, it is
possible to afford broad protection to investors under the two acts by
interpreting the acts to cover a variety of investment schemes and con-
trivances which do not fit neatly within the statutory language. 35 On
the other hand, this flexible approach may also exclude those transac-
tions which are described in investment terms but which are not invest-
ments in reality and, therefore, not within the intended coverage of
federal securities law. 36
In the final analysis, the interpretation and application of the 1933
and 1934 Acts depend upon two inquiries: first, whether the transaction
in question falls within the literal reading of the statute and, second,
whether Congress intended for federal securities law to encompass such
27. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975).
28. Id. at 852, quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
29. Profits may include capital appreciation or income derived from the use and development
of the investor's contribution to the venture. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
852 (1975).
30. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S.
344, 350-51 (1943).
31. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight,
389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b, 78c (1976).
33. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969).
34. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975), quoting Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
35. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
36. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (interest in com-
pulsory, non-contributory pension plan not a security despite statutory definition encompassing
such a plan); United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) ("shares" of stock
entitling holder to lease an apartment not a security despite designation as such).
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a transaction. If the answer to either of these inquiries is in the nega-
tive, federal securities law does not apply to the transaction.
THE CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUITS
Prior to the Second Circuit's decision in Securities & Exchange
Commission v. Guild Films Co., 37 it was generally considered that a
pledge of securities as collateral for a loan did not constitute a "sale" of
securities under the federal securities acts.38 In GuildFilms, two banks
jointly made a loan to defendant Roach who controlled a substantial
block of unregistered Guild Films stock. The defendant banks were
partially secured on the loan by unregistered Guild Films stock. After
Roach defaulted on the loan, the banks began to sell the unregistered
securities on a stock exchange. 39 The SEC sought an injunction in fed-
eral district court to prevent the sale and delivery after sale of the un-
registered Guild Films stock unless the securities were first registered as
required by the 1933 Act.4 0
In granting the injunction, the district court found that the bor-
rower had purchased and later pledged the securities with the intent
that the banks would sell the stock for his benefit.4' The court found
that the borrower was an underwriter under section 2(11) of the 1933
Act 42 because Roach purchased the stock with a view toward distribu-
tion of the stock.43 The district court also found that the banks were
underwriters under section 2(11) because they sold the unregistered
stock for the benefit of the borrower.44
On appeal, the banks asserted that, since they did not purchase the
stock as underwriters, they were exempt from the registration provi-
37. 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819 (1960).
38. Loss, supra note 8, at 517.
39. 279 F.2d at 487-89. The banks initially had difficulty obtaining title to the pledged secur-
ities because the transfer agent refused to transfer the pledged stock to the banks because the stock
certificates bore a restrictive legend which prohibited the transfer, pledge, or sale of the unregis-
tered securities. The banks succeeded in obtaining an order in state court compelling the transfer
of the stock to the banks. Id.
40. SEC v. Guild Films Co., 178 F. Supp. 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), affid, 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819 (1960).
41. 178 F. Supp. at 424.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(il) (1976).
43. 178 F. Supp. at 424. Section 5(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1976), requires that
a registration statement be in effect prior to the sale, or delivery for sale, of a security. Section 4(1)
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(l) (1976), makes the requirements of section 5 applicable to
underwriters. The district court's finding that the borrower and banks were underwriters meant
that they had violated section 5 because there was no registration statement in effect prior to the
sale of the securities.
44. 178 F. Supp. at 424.
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sions of the 1933 Act.45 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's order; however, it took a
more expansive view of the issue. The Second Circuit reasoned that
the banks were underwriters of the pledged stock because they had
purchased the stock by means of a pledge. 46 The Second Circuit in
GuildFilms brought the sale of pledged securities by the pledgee within
the registration provisions of the 1933 Act.47 Unlike the district court,
which relied heavily upon the facts of the case, the Second Circuit
seemingly enunciated a per se rule requiring compliance with the 1933
Act's registration requirements whenever a pledgee resorts to selling
pledged securities to satisfy the underlying debt.48
Sixteen years after Guild Films, the Second Circuit was confronted
with the issue of whether a pledge of securities constitutes a "sale"
under the antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act. In United States v. Gen-
tile,4 9 the defendants were convicted of a scheme which involved the
sale and pledge of stock certificates which had been entrusted to them.
The defendants had access to blank stock certificates of various compa-
nies because one of them was the president of a stock transfer firm.
The defendants issued certificates in their own names without authori-
zation from the issuing corporation. They subsequently sold or
pledged the securities. 50  Eventually, they were apprehended and
charged with violating and conspiring to violate section 17(a) of the
1933 Act. 5'
In affirming their conviction, the Second Circuit determined that a
pledge of securities as collateral for a loan was a "disposition of...
[an] interest in a security for value" 52 and that, therefore, the pledge
constituted a "sale" 53 of securities under section 2(3) of the 1933 Act. 54
The court stated that section 2(3) does not require that title pass to
45. 279 F.2d at 489.
46. The Second Circuit relied upon the broadly-worded definition of sale in section 2(3) of
the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1976), in determining that a pledge of securities constituted a
sale. The court had no difficulty in finding that a pledge was a "disposition of a security or interest
in a security, for value" under section 2(3). 279 F.2d at 489. The court also noted that Congress
rejected a proposed provision to the 1933 Act which would. have exempted sales of securities from
the registration provisions where the sale was for the purpose of liquidating a bona fide debt. Id.,
citing S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 126 (1933).
47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
48. Compare Guild Films with SEC v. Dolnik, 501 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1974). Do/nik is dis-
cussed in the text accompanying notes 119-26 infra.
49. 530 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976).
50. 530 F.2d at 463-64.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976) [hereinafter referred to as section 17(a)].
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1976).
53. Id.
54. 530 F.2d at 466.
1232
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constitute a "sale" and that the defendants' conduct fell within the
strict construction which is applied to criminal statutes.55 To further
support its conclusion, the Gentile court reasoned that the result which
it reached was implicit in the Guild Films decision. 56 The Second Cir-
cuit noted that the pledgee, in accepting the securities, "assumes a very
real investment risk that the securities will have continuing value, a risk
that is identical in nature to the risk taken by investors. '57 The Second
Circuit bolstered its conclusion by relating its decision to the investor-
oriented goal of federal securities law.
In Aallis v. FDIC,58 the Second Circuit considered whether a
pledge of securities constitutes a "sale" under the antifraud provisions
of the 1934 Act. In that case, two dentists made a loan to an attorney to
finance the purchase of stock from a third party. Pursuant to the loan
agreement, the attorney delivered the securities to the dentists as collat-
eral for the loan. After the attorney defaulted on his obligation to re-
pay the loan, the dentists learned that the stock was worthless.59
Subsequently, the dentists filed suit alleging, inter alia, violations of
section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5. 6° The district court held that the dentists
lacked standing to pursue their claim under the antifraud provisions of
the 1934 Act because no "sale" of securities had occurred. 6'
Addressing the issue of whether a "sale" had occurred, the Second
Circuit reconsidered its prior decisions in Guild Films and Gentile. The
court noted that Gentile had expanded the Guild Films concept of
"'sale" to include a pledge of securities for purposes of section 17(a) of
the 1933 Act. The Second Circuit reiterated the investor-oriented goal
of the federal securities acts and concluded that there was no sound
basis for denominating a pledge as a "sale" for a criminal prosecution 62
but not for a civil action under the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and
1934 Acts.63 The court held that the acceptance of the pledge of stock
55. Id.
56. Id. at 467. For a discussion of Guild Films, see text accompanying notes 37-48 supra.
57. 530 F.2d at 467.
58. 568 F.2d 824 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 431 U.S. 928 (1977), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 435 U.S. 381 (1978).
59. 568 F.2d at 826. The stock purchased by the attorney had previously been pledged by the
seller to Bankers Trust Company as security for a loan. One year prior to the sale of stock to the
attorney, the issuing corporation notified Bankers Trust that the seller's shares had been recalled
for cancellation. Therefore, at the time of the sale, the stock was worthless. Id.
60. The essence of the dentists' claim against Bankers Trust was that Bankers Trust made
material misrepresentations at the time it released the seller's stock for transfer to the attorney in
violation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Id. at 826-27.
61. Mallis v. FDIC, 407 F. Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
62. United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976).
63. 568 F.2d at 829.
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by the dentists resulted in a "sale" for purposes of section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5. 64
In the year following Mfallis, however, the same question was an-
swered in the negative by the Fifth Circuit in National Bank of Com-
merce v. All American Assurance Co. 65 In that case, the controlling
shareholder of a corporation arranged for the corporation to issue a
new class of stock. The newly-created stock was issued without ap-
proval of the corporation's directors and was therefore worthless.
Plaintiff bank accepted the worthless stock as collateral for a loan made
to the controlling shareholder. The issuing corporation was subse-
quently adjudicated bankrupt and the pledgee bank suffered a $1.45
million loss on the loan.66 The bank filed suit alleging violations of the
antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 67 The district court
dismissed the action on jurisdictional grounds because no "sale" of se-
curities had occurred in connection with the alleged fraud.68
Prior to considering whether a pledge of securities constitutes a
"sale," the Fifth Circuit noted that, although the wording of the defini-
tions of "purchase," "sale," and "security" in the 1933 Act and 1934
Act differ slightly, the terms are functionally equivalent. Since the
court found no distinction between the facts of All American and those
involved in the Second Circuit's decisions in Gentile and Mallis, it pro-
ceeded to examine the rationale of the Second Circuit cases. The Fifth
Circuit acknowledged that, as a policy matter, federal securities law
could encompass pledges as it certainly does sales and purchases. But
the court felt that, in reality, the securities acts do not extend to pledges.
The Fifth Circuit did not agree with the Second Circuit's determination
that a pledgee takes an investment risk. The court discounted the risk
taken by a pledgee because state law provides a pledgee with a remedy
on the note against the maker. Thus, federal law was not needed to
regulate pledge transactions.69 The court also noted that the rights and
privileges of the parties to a pledge are not affected to the same degree
as with a sale of securities.70 Finally, the court drew an analogy to the
64. The Second Circuit indicated that the release of the pledged securities by Bankers Trust
also constituted a "sale" of securities. Id. at 830. The court reversed the lower court's dismissal of
the action and granted plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. Id.
65. 583 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1978).
66. Id. at 1296.
67. The plaintiff bank alleged violations of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)
(1976), section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1977).
68. 583 F.2d at 1300.
69. Id.
70. The pledgor generally has the right to sell the security subject to the encumbrance, to vote
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rationale used by the United States Supreme Court in Tcherepnin v.
Knight7' where the Court stated, in defining a "security," "form should
be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic
reality. ' 72 The Fifth Circuit, in affirming the lower court's order dis-
missing the action, concluded that in this situation the form of the
transaction, a collateral loan, also constituted the substance of the
transaction. 73
The Sixth Circuit, in Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben,74 was
the most recent circuit court, prior to the Seventh Circuit in Herber, to
consider whether a pledge of securities constitutes a sale. Mansbach,
an investor, pledged 300 corporate bonds to a securities brokerage firm
as collateral for his trading in stock options. When the investor settled
his account with the brokerage firm, a dispute arose as to the amount
due on the account. The securities firm initially refused to release the
pledged bonds until Mansbach executed a release absolving the broker-
age firm of any liability. Eventually, the firm released 295 of the 300
pledged bonds to Mansbach. Mansbach subsequently filed suit, alleg-
ing violations of section 10(b) and rule lob-5. 75
Among the issues which faced the Sixth Circuit on appeal was
whether a pledge of securities constitutes a "purchase" or "sale" of se-
curities under section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5. 76 After considering the re-
spective merits of Gentile,77 Mallis,78 and All American,79 the court
summarily adopted the reasoning of the Second Circuit rather than
that of the Fifth Circuit and held that a pledge of securities was a
"sale" for purposes of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. The court also
sought to reconcile its position with that of the Fifth Circuit by noting
that the pledge of securities was to a broker-dealer, not to a commercial
lender, and that the pledge was intended to serve as collateral for secur-
the stock, to receive dividends or interest, and he is liable for any ad valorem taxes. The pledgee,
on the other hand, can only sell the stock upon the pledgor's default, does noi share in the income
or appreciation of the security, and has none of the rights afforded shareholders. Id.
71. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
72. Id. at 336.
73. 583 F.2d at 1300.
74. 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979). Mansbach was decided after briefing and oral argument in
Herber, but prior to the Seventh Circuit's decision.
75. Id. at 1019-21. The investor sought to recover the loss which he incurred due to the
alleged wrongful retention of the bonds by the brokerage firm. The loss resulted from a decrease
in the market price of the bonds between the time when demand for the bonds was made and the
time when the bonds were released and sold. Id. at 1021.
76. Id. at 1022.
77. See text accompanying notes 49-57 supra.
78. See text accompanying notes 58-64 supra.
79. See text accompanying notes 65-73 supra.
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ities transactions, not to secure a commercial loan. The Sixth Circuit
further speculated that the impact on the securities industry which the
Mansbach facts presented did not necessarily preclude the Fifth Circuit
from reaching the same conclusion based upon similar facts.80
LINCOLN NATIONAL BANK v HERBER
Facts of the Case
After experiencing serious financial difficulties, John Lampe, an
attorney, conceived a scheme to restore himself to solvency. In July
1972, Lampe established a revocable inter vivos trust at defendant First
National Bank of Lake Forest 8' with himself as the trustee and sole
income beneficiary. The corpus of the trust consisted of counterfeit se-
curities which Lampe had obtained and which, if legitimate, would
have had a market value in excess of three million dollars. Lampe in-
formed defendant Herber, a neighbor and vice president of defendant
Bank of Lake Forest, that he recently inherited a substantial legacy
from his father and that he planned an attempt at business. 82
In January 1973, Lampe obtained short-term financing from Bank
of Lake Forest to retire a debt incurred in his purchase of a manufac-
turing business. To secure his obligation to Bank of Lake Forest,
Lampe pledged the counterfeit securities which were held in his trust at
Bank of Lake Forest. Although Lampe was unable to pay the loan
when it matured, he continued his plans for expansion. In September
1973, Lampe arranged to purchase another company with financing
from Associates Capital.8 3 Associates Capital invited plaintiff Lincoln
National Bank 84 to participate in this loan to Lampe. Prior to agreeing
to participate in the loan, Lincoln contacted Herber at Bank of Lake
Forest as part of its investigation of Lampe. Herber spoke favorably of
Lampe and his relationship with Bank of Lake Forest and confirmed
that Lampe was wealthy.8 5
In December 1973, Lampe applied directly to Lincoln for a loan
which he intended to use to pay down a portion of his debt to Bank of
Lake Forest. As security for this loan, Lampe agreed to pledge a por-
80. 598 F.2d at 1028-30.
81. Hereinafter referred to as Bank of Lake Forest.
82. Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Lampe, No. 75 C 2806, slip op. at 1-2 (N.D. Iil. June 21, 1978)
(unpublished opinion).
83. Id. at 3-4.
84. Hereinafter referred to as Lincoln.
85. No. 75 C 2806, slip op. at 4-5.
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tion of the securities held in trust at Bank of Lake Forest.86 During
Lincoln's credit investigation of Lampe, Lincoln again contacted
Herber at Bank of Lake Forest. Herber again told Lincoln that Bank
of Lake Forest's relationship with Lampe was satisfactory and that
Lampe was the beneficiary of a trust consisting of negotiable securities.
Initially, Lampe and Lincoln agreed that the securities which were
to be pledged would be held in an escrow account at Bank of Lake
Forest, but Lincoln's counsel subsequently required it to take physical
possession of the collateral. This loan to Lampe was the first of a series
of loans which Lincoln made to Lampe during the spring and summer
of 1974. By September 1974, Lampe's outstanding indebtedness to Lin-
coln was $842,000.87
Until September 1974, Lampe's relationship with Lincoln was sat-
isfactory and Lincoln's suspicion had not been aroused. In mid-Sep-
tember, however, Lincoln reviewed the Lampe loans and concluded
that Lampe's financial position was not favorable. Lincoln, however,
did not take any immediate steps to rectify the situation. In late Sep-
tember, Lampe defaulted on the first loan and Lincoln granted Lampe
an extension to repay the loan. In November 1974, the entire scheme
fell apart when Lampe was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation for counterfeiting securities. Lincoln reduced its claim against
Lampe to judgment in state court, but the judgment was uncollecti-
ble.88
The District Court's Holding
Lincoln subsequently filed suit in federal district court against the
solvent defendants, Bank of Lake Forest and Herber, and also against
Lampe, alleging violations of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act,89 section
10(b) of the 1934 Act,90 and rule lOb-5. 91 The essence of Lincoln's
86. Brief for Appellant at 14-15, Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1039 (7th Cir. 1979).
87. No. 75 C 2806, slip op. at 4-7.
88. Id. at 7.
89. Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by
use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact
or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
90. Section 10(b) provides:
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claims against Herber and Lake Forest was that they failed to inform
Lincoln during its investigation of Lampe that Lampe was in default on
his obligation to Bank of Lake Forest and that they made material mis-
representations concerning Lampe's financial condition. Lincoln
claimed that it was a purchaser of the securities by virtue of its accept-
ance of the pledge of Lampe's counterfeit securities. In addition, the
plaintiff contended that the actions of Bank of Lake Forest and Herber
constituted fraud in connection with Lincoln's purchase of the securi-
ties in violation of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities acts.
Each of the defendants filed motions to dismiss Lincoln's complaint. 92
One count of Lincoln's complaint alleged a fraudulent loan trans-
action between Lampe and Lincoln. Lincoln asserted federal jurisdic-
tion by claiming that the promissory notes executed by Lampe were
securities under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The district court found that
the promissory notes did not form a basis for exercising federal juris-
diction because the notes were of a commercial rather than an invest-
ment nature.93
As a second ground for asserting federal jurisdiction, Lincoln
claimed that the pledge of securities as collateral for the loans consti-
tuted a "sale" of securities. With respect to Lampe, the district court
concluded that "mere acceptance of a pledge of stock as collateral for a
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
[Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
91. Rule lob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1974). Rule lOb-5 was adopted by the SEC in 1942 to effectuate the provi-
sions of section 10(b). See SEC Exch. Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
92. 414 F. Supp. at 1282. Lincoln also alleged common law fraud against defendants in a
pendent state claim. Id.
93. The district court stated that the critical inquiry was "'whether the plaintiffs are simply
borrowers in a commercial transaction who are not protected by the 1934 Act or investors in a
securities transaction who are protected.'" Id. at 1275, quoting C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G.
Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th Cir. 1975).
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commercial loan transaction does not invoke the protection of federal
securities law."9 4 Nevertheless, the court found that Lincoln, in effect,
had purchased the counterfeit securities because foreclosure on the
loans would be a futile gesture. 95 The district court, however, dis-
missed Lincoln's claims against Herber and Bank of Lake Forest and
granted the plaintiff leave to amend its complaint.96 Lincoln subse-
quently amended its complaint as it pertained to Herber and Bank of
Lake Forest, whereupon Herber and Bank of Lake Forest filed motions
for summary judgment.
In an unpublished opinion on the motions for summary judgment,
the district court concluded that the pledge of securities constituted a
forced sale of the securities to Lincoln when Lincoln learned that the
loans to Lampe were in default and uncollectible. The court reasoned
that foreclosure would be futile since the securities were worthless and
held that this "constructive foreclosure" satisfied the "sale" require-
ment under federal securities law.97  The district court, however,
granted summary judgment for Herber and Bank of Lake Forest be-
cause the record failed to establish the liability of Herber or Bank of
Lake Forest. 98
The Seventh Circuit's Decision
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, Lincoln sought to overturn the lower court's order granting
summary judgment for the solvent defendants Herber and Bank of
Lake Forest.99 The issues presented to the Seventh Circuit were: (1)
whether the federal securities law applied to the pledge transaction and
(2) whether defendants Herber and Bank of Lake Forest were liable
94. 414 F. Supp. at 1277.
95. Id. at 1278. Although not an issue, the district court noted that counterfeit securities are
securities within the meaning of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Id. at 1277,following Seeman v. United
States, 90 F.2d 88, 89 (5th Cir. 1937).
96. The district court dismissed Lincoln's claims against Herber and Bank of Lake Forest
because the complaint failed to specifically inform them of the particular acts of fraud which
formed the basis of Lincoln's claims as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 414 F.
Supp. at 1278-79.
97. No. 75 C 2806, slip op. at 11. The "constructive foreclosure" reasoning appeared in the
district court's published opinion. 414 F. Supp. at 1278. In his subsequent unpublished opinion,
Judge Decker reaffirmed that rationale, noting that the intervening Gentile and Mallis decisions
reaffirmed his prior conclusion that a pledge of securities constituted a "sale." No. 75 C 2806, slip
op. at 11-12.
98. No. 75 C 2806, slip op. at 29-30. The court concluded that there was fraud which was
directly related to the value of the stock pledged to Lincoln, but that Herber and Bank of Lake
Forest were not responsible for that fraud.
99. Lampe was not a party to the appeal. 604 F.2d at 1039.
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under the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 00
Lincoln advanced two theories to support its contention that fed-
eral securities law applied to the pledge transaction. Lincoln first
claimed that the promissory notes which evidenced the loans made to
Lampe were securities as defined by the 1933 and 1934 Acts. In re-
jecting this contention, the Seventh Circuit adopted the district court's
opinion on this issue' 0 ' and held that promissory notes which are com-
mercial in nature do not form a basis for exercising federal jurisdiction
under the securities acts.'0 2 The second issue of whether the pledge of
securities constituted a "sale" within the meaning of the antifraud pro-
visions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts presented a more difficult question to
the court.
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis with a review of the lan-
guage of the pertinent statutes. Although the court recognized that the
definition of "sale" in the 1933 Act differed somewhat from the defini-
tions of "sale" and "purchase" in the 1934 Act, Judge Castle chose to
interpret the definitions in the same fashion. After concluding that a
pledge fell within the broadly-worded definition of "sale" in the securi-
ties acts, the court further considered the admonishing provision, "un-
less the context otherwise requires."' 0 3 The court rejected a literal
reading of the federal securities acts and adopted a "context over form"
approach in interpreting the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Using this "context
over form" approach, 'o Judge Castle analyzed the issue by considering
the legislative history of the securities acts and the underlying eco-
nomic realities of the pledge transaction. 0 5
In its review of the legislative history of the two securities acts, the
Seventh Circuit stated that the well-established purpose of the securi-
ties acts was to protect the investor in his transactions in the securities
market and that Congress was concerned with regulating the use of
credit only as it relates to transactions in the market. The court con-
cluded that the use of credit by Lampe in a commercial setting was not
the sort of transaction which would affect the securities market. The
court next reviewed the history of the provisions in the 1933 and 1934
Acts and did not find any evidence to support Lincoln's contention that
a pledge fell within the 1933 and 1934 Acts' definition of "sale." The
100. Id.
101. Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Lampe, 414 F. Supp. 1270, 1274-76 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
102. 604 F.2d at 1039.
103. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b, 78c (1976).
104. 604 F.2d at 1041.
105. Id. at 1041-42.
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court also noted that a pledge was specifically included within the defi-
nition of "sale" in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.106
This appeared to lend further support to the court's conclusion that
Congress, in drafting the 1933 and 1934 Acts, could have included a
pledge within the definition of "sale" but declined to do so.'0 7
Judge Castle next analyzed the problem in terms of whether the
pledge constituted an investment or commercial risk to the pledgee.
The court discussed the Second Circuit decisions in Mali l08 and Gen-
tile'0 9 both of which held that a pledgee assumes an investment risk
because the pledgee is assuming the risk that the stock will have contin-
uing value. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that risk was involved
but disagreed that it was an investment risk. The court stated that "the
risk is taken for the purpose of making a loan, not for the purpose of
investing in securities."'" 0 Although the court found the facts of
Herber distinguishable from those of Mallis and Gentile,"' it disap-
proved of the overly broad holdings in those cases.' 2 In rejecting the
literal approach to the 1933 and 1934 Acts taken by the Second Circuit,
the court adopted a "context over form" approach which the Supreme
Court had utilized in cases which dealt with the interpretation of other
sections of the securities acts.' 13 The court's holding that a "sale" of
securities does not occur at the time the securities are pledged' 14 was
found to be in accord with the Fifth Circuit's decision in All Ameri-
can." 5 Judge Castle recognized that a "sale" could occur where the
pledgor defaults and the securities actually are sold, but he ruled that a
pledge, without actual foreclosure, is not sufficient to bring the transac-
tion within the antifraud provisions of federal securities law.' 16
106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1976). Section 2(23) of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935 defines "sale" or "sell" as including "any sale, disposition by lease, exchange or
pledge, or other disposition." 15 U.S.C. § 79b(23) (1976) (emphasis added).
107. 604 F.2d at 1042.
108. See text accompanying notes 58-64 supra.
109. See text accompanying notes 49-57 supra.
110. 604 F.2d at 1042.
Ill. Id. at 1042-44.
112. Id. at 1044.
113. Id. at 1041; see text accompanying notes 30-36 supra.
114. 604 F.2d at 1044.
115. See text accompanying notes 65-73 supra.
116. 604 F.2d at 1044. In affirming the district court's judgment for defendants, the Seventh
Circuit found it unnecessary to decide whether Herber and Bank of Lake Forest possessed the
requisite scienter to make them liable under the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
Id. at 1039.
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ANALYSIS
"Unless the Context Otherwise Requires"
One aspect of Herber which merits attention is the chameleon-like
interpretation of a "sale" in the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Under section 2(3)
of the 1933 Act, a pledge literally falls within the definition of a "sale"
since it is a "disposition of an interest in a security, for value." '" 7 Like-
wise, to pledge is to "otherwise dispose of" a security under section
3(14) of the 1934 Act."t 8 In Securities & Exchange Commission v.
Dolnik, "19 the Seventh Circuit had held that a pledge of securities did
constitute a "sale" of securities under section 2(3) where a statutory
underwriter attempted to distribute unregistered pledged securities. 120
In contrast, the Herber court held that a pledge of securities did not
constitute a "sale" for purposes of the antifraud provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Acts. The resolution of this apparent inconsistency in defin-
ing a "sale" can be explained by reference to the prefatory caution,
"unless the context otherwise requires," to the definitional sections of
each act. 121 The contextual approach which Congress imparted to the
two acts and which the United States Supreme Court has frequently
reaffirmed 22 discounts the use of a strictly literal approach to the inter-
pretation of the securities acts. 123
Another factor which undoubtedly contributed to the Seventh Cir-
cuit's variable approach to defining a "sale" in Do/nik and Herber is
that Dolnik involved a commercial loan transaction. In Dolnik, a de-
termination that a pledge did not constitute a "sale" of securities would
have frustrated the primary goal of the 1933 Act.124 In the latter case,
the relationship between the pledge transaction and the underlying
purposes of the two securities acts 125 is more attenuated. A third distin-
117. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1976).
118. Id. § 78c(14).
119. 501 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1974). The Herber opinion does not mention Dolnik.
120. Compare Do/nik with SEC v. Guild Films, 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
819 (1960). Guild Films is discussed in the text accompanying notes 37-48 supra.
121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b, 78c (1976).
122. See, e.g., SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969) and cases cited in note 136
infra.
123. See text accompanying notes 30-36 supra. The United States Supreme Court has noted
that only the Second Circuit has taken a literal approach in defining a "security" under the federal
securities acts. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 n.14 (1975).
124. The 1933 Act is primarily concerned with the distribution of securities to the public.
Under this act, disclosure of the nature of the offered securities and the parties involved in the
distribution of securities is required. In order to satisfy the disclosure requirements, a registration
statement containing basic information must be in effect prior to the sale, or delivery for sale, of
the securities to the public. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976). See Loss, supra note 8, at 130.
125. See text accompanying notes 8-18 supra.
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guishing feature is that Dolnik involved a suit brought by the SEC,
whereas Herber involved a suit brought by a private party. In Dolnik,
the definition of a "sale" was relevant to the scope of the 1933 Act's
registration provisions and not to the issue of standing. 126
When Herber and Dolnik are considered together, the Seventh
Circuit's approach to issues arising under the definitional sections of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts results in a case-by-case approach. Non-statu-
tory factors, such as congressional intent behind the two acts, Supreme
Court decisions involving similar issues, and a contextual approach to
the issues, form the analytical framework within which the Seventh
Circuit operates. The mere fact that a pledge falls within the literal
definition of a "sale" cannot be dispositive of the issue without further
inquiry into non-statutory factors.
The Economic Realities of the Pledge Transaction
The major focus of Judge Castle's opinion was his consideration of
the underlying economic realities of the pledge transaction. 27 In con-
sidering the "sale" issue, the Seventh Circuit analyzed the issue in
terms of whether the pledge constituted an investment risk or a com-
mercial risk. Authority for this investment-commercial dichotomy can
be found in various Supreme Court cases in which the Court consid-
ered whether a particular device constituted a "security."' 128 In deter-
mining whether the various devices presented in the cases constituted a
"security," the Court looked to whether a device used was an invest-
ment vehicle, that is, a "contract or scheme for the placing of capital or
laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from
its employment."'' 29 Another factor indicating investment character
was that the profit was to be derived from the efforts of persons other
than the contributor. 30 The fact that the investment is not speculative
and has a value independent of the common enterprise does not place
the device outside the coverage of federal securities law. 13' By defini-
126. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466-67, 467 n.9 (1969).
127. 604 F.2d at 1042-44.
128. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (interest in com-
pulsory, non-contributory pension plan not a security); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837 (1975) ("shares" of stock entitling holder to lease apartment not a security despite
designation as such); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (withdrawable capital shares of
savings and loan association held to be a security); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946)
("unit" of citrus grove development held to be a security).
129. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
130. Id. at 298-99.
131. Id. at 301.
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tion, a purely commercial device would fall outside of the Court's inter-
pretation of a "security" under the "context over form" approach.
In viewing the underlying economic realities of the pledge ac-
cepted by Lincoln, it is apparent that Lincoln was concerned with the
possible dilution of collateral through the decrease in value of the
pledged stock. However, the pledge transaction did not constitute the
placing of funds in a venture operated by Lampe for the purposes of
reaping profits for Lincoln. Lincoln's only interest in whether Lampe's
use of its money resulted in profits to Lampe was Lincoln's concern
with whether Lampe would have a source from which to repay the
loans. Lincoln's interest in Lampe's profitability was not that of a party
who expected to gain an undeterminable share of the profits. Rather,
Lincoln expected to be repaid the amount of the loans, with interest.
Assurance of repayment by Lampe was in the form of securities which
Lincoln held as the pledgee. Lincoln was not an investor in Lampe's
venture; it was a commercial lender holding securities as collateral for
the loan.
In his discussion of the economic realties of the pledge transaction,
however, Judge Castle failed to set forth any criteria by which an in-
vestment risk is distinguishable from a commercial risk. The salient
aspects of the pledge transaction, however, do offer a basis for distin-
guishing between the types of risk. The following inquiries are sug-
gested to generate a partial list of distinguishing features:
(1) Whether the party at risk provides the impetus for the trans-
action. In the investment situation, an investor with financial resources
will seek a vehicle through which financial gains can be expected,
whereas in the commercial loan situation, the person lacking financial
resources will actively seek funds. 132
(2) Whether the party at risk receives any equity or ownership
interest in the venture. In many cases, the investor will become an
owner of the venture and may determine who will manage the venture
(e.g., common stock), whereas a commercial lender does not receive an
ownership interest in the venture and does not have any control over
the venture.
(3) Whether the transaction is related to the transaction to the
securities industry. If the transaction has a close relationship to the
securities industry, it is more likely that federal securities law will be
held to govern the transaction.
(4) Whether the party at risk has any control over the extent to
132. C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th Cir. 1975).
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which he is at risk. In the investment situation, the investor does not
have any effective control over the extent to which he is at risk. Natu-
rally, some investments are less speculative than others, but the only
effective control which the investor has over the risk is his decision
whether or not to invest. In the case of the commercial lender, the
lender can demand sufficient security for the loan and reduce the po-
tential for loss through diligent appraisal of the collateral for the loan.
In addition, the commercial lender can require the borrower to furnish
additional collateral if the security for the loan becomes insufficient.
(5) Whether there are remedies available to the plaintiff if the
venture fails. In an investment context, the failure of the venture re-
sults in a loss of all or a substantial portion of his investment. A com-
mercial lender, however, has recourse to the loan collateral and can
foreclose on the collateral if a default occurs.
Some Policy Considerations
The Seventh Circuit's inquiry into the applicability of federal se-
curities law to the pledge of counterfeit securities resulted in a determi-
nation of whether Lincoln had standing to pursue its claim under the
antifraud provisions of the securities acts. Since only actual purchasers
and sellers have standing to prosecute a private action for a violation of
the antifraud provisions of the securities acts, 133 Lincoln's failure to
show that it acquired the securities by means of a "sale" precluded it
from proving the alleged fraud of Herber and Bank of Lake Forest. By
declining to permit a "sale" to encompass pledge transactions, the Sev-
enth Circuit has insulated certain federal defendants from federal lia-
bility and denied a prospective class of plaintiffs a federal remedy.
Nevertheless, the court's concern about the expansion of federal
securities law into a potentially troublesome area is reflected in the
court's express rejection of the district court's doctrine of "constructive
foreclosure," 34 although it avoided the issue of whether a "sale" occurs
upon actual foreclosure. 135 It is apparent that the Seventh Circuit is
133. This rule as first enunciated in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel, 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), limits standing to pursue a private remedy under section 10(b) and
rule 1Ob-5 to only those persons who are actual, rather than prospective, purchasers and sellers.
The United States Supreme Court approved the Birnbaum rule in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975).
134. The essence of the "constructive foreclosure" doctrine is that, since the counterfeit securi-
ties were worthless, the act of foreclosing on the loan would be a futile gesture. Since the law does
not require a party to perform useless acts, the district court treated the loan as having been
foreclosed upon by Lincoln. Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Lampe, 414 F. Supp. 1270, 1278 (N.D. Ill.
1976).
135. 604 F.2d at 1044.
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unwilling to expand the coverage of federal securities law into the
realm of legal fiction. This is founded upon sound policy considera-
tions since it is conceivable that lower courts could fashion other legal
fictions to provide a remedy under federal securities law. Through its
rejection of the "constructive foreclosure" doctrine and, by implication,
other legal fictions, the Seventh Circuit is avoiding the potential dan-
gers which might result from an expansion of the class of plaintiffs who
have standing to pursue private causes of action under the federal se-
curities acts.
The Seventh Circuit's decision is in accord with recent United
States Supreme Court cases which have limited the scope and coverage
of the federal securities acts. 136 In each of these cases, the Court has
limited the rights and remedies of the private-party plaintiff under the
federal securities acts. 137 One commentator noting this trend stated
that "[t]here can be little doubt about the intensity of the Court's con-
cern over the expansion of securities liability and its determination to
curb that expansion."138
One final consideration which also militates against finding an im-
plied right of action for the injured pledgee of securities is that state
remedies are readily available. A defrauded pledgee of securities can
pursue its claim under the state common law of fraud. In addition,
Articles 8 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code regulate the transfer
of investment securities and security interests in instruments, 39 respec-
tively, and would be applicable to the pledge of securities."40 There-
136. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (section 17(a) of the 1934 Act
requiring broker-dealers to keep certain records and to file periodic reports as prescribed by the
SEC does not create an implied private right of action); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel,
439 U.S. 551 (1979) (interest in compulsory, non-contributory pension plan not a security); Santa
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (fraud under section 10(b) must be manipulative or decep-
tive to be actionable); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (section 14(e) of the 1934 Act
does not create an implied private cause of action in a defeated tender offeror); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter, not mere negligence, is a requisite element of a claim
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) (tradi-
tional showing for injunctive relief applies to implied causes of action under the federal securities
acts); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (standing under section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act is limited to actual purchasers or sellers); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v.
Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (no implied private cause of action under the Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970).
137. See O'Brien v. Continental I11. Nat'l Bank & Trust, Co., 593 F.2d 54, 62 n.13 (7th Cir.
1979).
138. 4 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW, FRAUD, SEC RULE 10B-5 § 384.2 (1977).
139. U.C.C. §§ 8-101 to 8-407, 9-101 to 9-507 (1978).
140. In Herber, the Seventh Circuit considered the applicability of the Uniform Commercial
Code to the pledge transaction and concluded that Lincoln could pursue its claim under the Illi-
nois codification of the U.C.C., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, §§ 8-101 to 8-407, 9-101 to 9-507 (1977 &
Supp. 1978). 604 F.2d at 1044.
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fore, the denial of a federal remedy under federal securities law in no
way bars a plaintiff, such as Lincoln, from seeking alternate remedies.
CONCLUSION
In Lincoln National Bank v. Herber, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a pledge of securities as col-
lateral for a commercial loan did not constitute a "sale" of securities for
purposes of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The court based its conclusion
upon a careful reading of the definitional sections of the 1933 and 1934
Acts in conjunction with the legislative history and congressional pur-
pose behind the two acts.
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have limited
the expansion of the scope and coverage of federal securities law. The
Seventh Circuit's decision in Lincoln National Bank v. Herber is in ac-
cord with these recent Supreme Court cases and reflects the Supreme
Court's concern with the unwarranted expansion of the scope of federal
securities law.
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